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In contexts of entrenched metropolitan inequality and limited local resources,
organizers and community activists often feel a sense of urgency to target higher
levels of government. This paper offers one such case from Detroit, of local orga-
nizing projects that “scaled up” in the mid-1990s to pursue a regional equity agenda.
Drawing on participant observation, archival data, and interviews, the paper exam-
ines the process of unification and identifies key shifts in purpose, relational base,
approach to leadership, and strategy for empowerment. While scaling up enabled
members to engage in more sophisticated actions and influence higher levels of
policy making, it also challenged the organization to maintain its member base.
This research suggests that the process of scaling up poses tradeoffs for grassroots
organizations, between responsiveness to existing members and building a region-
ally representative organization, capable of transcending divisions of the political
environment.
INTRODUCTION
Numerous scholars of congregation-based community organizing (CBCO) have argued
that an eventual scaling up of local efforts is necessary to challenge the regional,
state, and national origins of metropolitan inequity (DeFilippis et al. 2010; Scully 2008;
Wilson 1999; Wood 2007). From Alinsky’s Chicago to present-day Camden, observers
have critiqued the limitations of parochial organizing and emphasized the need for
broader, more diverse coalitions (Gillette 2005; Santow 2007). By “scaling up,” I refer to a
process of coordination or unification among locally rooted organizations for increased
capacity, reach, and impact at higher levels of policy making.1
Existing research outlines the benefits of scaling up, both for the strength of organi-
zations and for policy impact. At the regional level, scaling up is a political strategy for
achieving policy coordination as a solution to urban crises, to overcome the isolation of
the urban poor and protect inner suburbs from disinvestment and decline (Dreier et
al. 2004; Orfield 1997, p. 50; Rusk 1993, 1999). It expands the scope of conflict to win
the weak new allies and put their issues on local and state policy agendas (Schattschnei-
der 1975). In the 1990s, the Gamaliel Foundation’s faith-based network adopted regional
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equity organizing to expand its reach through regional coalitions (Kleidman 2004; Pas-
tor et al. 2009, pp. 103–104; Swarts 2008). Regional equity offers a unifying theory that
neighborhood organizing lacks (Heathcott 2005, p. 290). It offers a strategy of building
collective power through coalitions that link the experiences of congregations across mu-
nicipal and racial boundaries (Dreier et al. 2004). Beyond the regional level, targeting
higher levels of government is a strategic decision as public coffers continue to shrink
locally (Swarts 2007, p. 134). Increasingly, governance is rescaling from the city to the
metropolitan level (Brenner 2003; Katz 2010). And organizing at a regional level or
higher creates opportunities for developing leadership, attracting resources, and shap-
ing policy that can “enhance the capacity for local work” (Warren 2001, p. 95).
The question of how to move beyond a local constituency is not new to organizing
(DeFilippis et al. 2010, p. 51).2 Robert Kleidman (2004) identifies a “dilemma of scale”
for organizers: how to influence higher-level targets “while retaining local organizing’s
participatory democracy” (p. 404). Existing research offers examples of organizations
that have scaled up successfully while maintaining local engagement.3 CBCO federations
tend to privilege local autonomy, but some networks have overcome this limitation by
effectively linking their local affiliates, such as the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) in
Texas and Arizona, or People Improving Communities Through Organizing (PICO) in
California. [See Appendix A for a complete list of abbreviations.]4 This coordination has
provided the contacts, expertise, and staff support necessary for local groups to assert in-
fluence in state politics (Warren 2001). In his research on PICO network, Richard Wood
(2007) describes the deliberative process that led PICO’s California affiliates to add na-
tional campaigns to their state and local organizing (also see Ganz 2000). This “broadly
consultative process” engaged leaders on whether and how to shift their energies, re-
sources, and political capital (p. 176).
Alongside the benefits of scaling up, scholars describe challenges and tensions for par-
ticipants. Whereas many local leaders feel a sense of urgency to expand, others ques-
tion how state or national goals reflect their self-interests (Warren 2001, p. 95). The en-
gagement of local people through a national “mobilization infrastructure” requires more
monetary resources, already scarce for CBCOs. And skill in local organizing does not
necessarily translate into policy expertise necessary for national advocacy (Miller 2008;
Swarts 2007, p. 137). The prospect of scaling up also raises tensions between prioritizing
the value of deliberation versus leadership-driven change, what Wood (2007) calls “en-
trepreneurial authority,” within democratic organizations (p. 187). For example, PICO’s
leaders have emphasized, “we are proposing a strategy—we don’t impose our will on any
project” (p. 179).
Existing research also suggests that the arrangement of social capital within commu-
nity organizations affects their capacity to scale up. Since the remaking of the IAF in
the 1970s, CBCO has sought to develop both bonding and bridging social capital, apply-
ing relational practices and cultural sensitivity to the power-based model (Cortes 1993;
DeFilippis et al. 2010; Rogers 1990; Warren 2001). The resulting model develops close-
knit relationships within congregations. But it also seeks bridging ties, linking more di-
verse institutions with common interests. Research suggests a fundamental tension in
this balance and that homogeneous organizations are more successful at mobilization
(Putnam 2000, 2007). Kristina Smock (2004) has found that organizing models tend to
emphasize either bonding or bridging. “Community building” and “women-centered”
models of organizing invest the most energy in mutual support but develop less capacity
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to expand their networks. In contrast, institution-based organizing is most successful at
increasing “community ability to solve problems through public action,” but offers a lim-
ited basis for mutual support (p. 95). Scaling up may reinforce CBCO’s tendency toward
weaker ties and lower responsiveness to members’ immediate concerns.
Although existing research has outlined key benefits and costs of scaling up local orga-
nizing, there is a need for a better understanding of transitions in organizational struc-
ture as a core element of organizing praxis. Scaling up is challenging because it requires
not just a replication of the same organization on a larger stage, but a transformation
of organizational form through a democratic process. A shift in purpose and scale re-
quires an expanding set of relationships and adaptations in the engagement of existing
members. Community organizing helps members to develop a shared public voice and to
be heard by public officials. But expanding in scale challenges groups to maintain their
identity and members’ sense of ownership.
RESEARCH METHODS
This case study follows the evolution of Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling
Strength (MOSES), a community organizing project in Detroit from 1989 to 2006. Case
study methodology brings the researcher into the context being analyzed, to “illuminate
a decision or set of decisions” (Schramm 1971, quoted in Yin, p. 12). The decisions of in-
terest in this case are the choices by organizers and leaders to scale up their local districts
for more power in the region and the state. To achieve contextual understanding and to
check sources, this chronology of organizational change incorporates data collected with
several methods, including archival research, participant observation, and interviews.5
From 2003 to 2006, I participated in staff, leadership, training, and task force meetings,
as well as in public action. Data were also collected from 49 semistructured interviews
recorded in 2005 and 2006 with organizers, clergy, and active lay leaders.6 Before begin-
ning interviews I conducted two focus groups in June 2005, one with a group of suburban
clergy north of the city, and one with African American clergy in Southwest Detroit. Based
on the focus groups and participation, I mostly limited interviews to city congregations
to focus on organizing challenges in the context of depopulation and disinvestment.7
The paper draws on time-ordered matrices for synthesis and analysis of multiple forms
of data across 17 years of MOSES’s history (Miles and Huberman 1994). By tracking key
changes in organizational structure and key events over time, I categorized key stages of
development and linked the changes in the organization’s structure to its goals, practices,
and democratic values.
PHASES IN ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The section below provides a history of the development of MOSES, from its precursors in
the late 1980s through the decision to unify in 2006. This history focuses on the evolution
of strategy determined by organizers and leaders in response to numerous factors: their
early actions, successes, and obstacles; expanding contacts; the process of learning about
regional equity; and interpretations of the political context. From this chronology four
phases of organizational structure become apparent: (1) independent, loosely connected
districts linking proximate congregations; (2) a period of discussion and transition
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Years 1989-1995 1996-1998 1999-2005 2006-present
Phases in 
Structure 
District-based: 
geographical districts 
maintain their own 
boards, issues, sub-
committees, and 
actions 
Transition into a 
city-wide structure, 
linking districts 
Representative 
city-wide 
organization, 
growing regionally 
Unified regional 
organization; 
districts dissolved 
FIG. 1. Timeline of MOSES’s organizational history, 1989–2006.
to connect and coordinate districts; (3) the formation of a representative, citywide or-
ganization, growing regionally; and (4) a unified regional organization. These phases are
represented as a timeline in Figure 1.
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT AND INITIAL ORGANIZING STRATEGY
In national parlance, “Detroit” conjures a single image of the Big Three automakers,
their rise, fall, and rebirth. But for residents of the metropolitan region—Super Bowl
ads notwithstanding8—the name signifies different things; its connotation changes with
municipal boundaries. In Southeast Michigan the name connotes racial divisions, eco-
nomic fragmentation, and competition among municipalities, often propagated by polit-
ical leaders seeking to consolidate support (Farley, Danziger, andHolzer 2000). Suburban
derision and Detroiters’ defensiveness have both failed to acknowledge how metropoli-
tan inequity stems from political and corporate choices. June Thomas’s (1997) research,
for example, details the inability of planners to prevent the city’s decline in the context
of larger forces, including the auto industry’s disinvestment, misguided urban renewal
projects, and racism, mobilized from the grassroots against integrated development (also
see Sugrue 1996).
The region has suffered without an urban regime to garner the private resources
and public support necessary for comprehensive revitalization (Orr and Stoker 1994,
p. 65; Stone 1989). Before Coleman Young’s mayoralty, Detroit lacked an entrepreneurial
leader to coordinate private resources necessary for redevelopment (Thomas 1997,
p. 124). Even with Young’s leadership—and at times because of it—Detroit’s urban
regime fragmented into several overlapping civic organizations (Orr and Stoker 1994).
Regional corporations lacked a material interest in the city beyond charity or public re-
lations, and the automotive industry could not be won back or replaced by downtown
redevelopment (Darden et al. 1987). Detroit also lacks any regional authority with teeth
for coordinating transit or land-use,9 and with electoral coalitions mapped onto segre-
gated municipalities, the political leadership of city and suburbs only reinforced existing
divisions. By the late 1980s political transformation seemed unlikely, even impossible, as
Detroit’s economic, physical, and social infrastructure deteriorated.
It is within this context that the history of MOSES begins, when a diverse group of
clergy began to consider how they could collaborate and create a “shared view of the fu-
ture of the city” that eluded elites (Orr and Stoker 1994, p. 67). In 1989, a dozen diverse
clergy united to address the crises of social dislocation and poverty in their neighbor-
hoods, forming the West Detroit Interfaith Community Organization (WDIFCO).10 It
was followed by the Jeremiah Project in 1993, which linked Latino parishes and other
diverse congregations in Southwest Detroit.11
54
THE EVOLUTION OF AN ORGANIZING STRATEGY IN DETROIT
Interested in the power-based model of organizing, the two nascent groups decided to
join the Gamaliel Foundation for training and support.12 Gamaliel uses a congregation-
based strategy, drawing on the organizational and cultural resources of congregations
for political action. Gamaliel trains organizers to develop one-on-one relationships with
clergy and lay people, to understand their concerns and to build “core teams” within
congregations who link the congregation to the larger network. In this model, active
laity become “leaders” who engage their peers to investigate local policy and commit to
direct action. Organizers encourage an awareness of self-interest and help individuals
understand their community challenges in a context of systemic inequities.
Gamaliel’s approach reflected an interpretation of neighborhood decline as a loss of
community and argued that the rebuilding of community requires both “in-reach”—
strengthening ties within congregations—and public pressure.13 This approach res-
onated with the clergy in WDIFCO and Jeremiah. A member priest said, “One of the
things we learned from the Gamaliel Foundation is the church across the country is suf-
fering from the deterioration of community. . . . We have to strengthen the church before
we can address social needs” (Ludtke 1994). According to this philosophy, clergy and lay
people need intentional training to build both healthy congregations and an actionable
community, an organized network of local people to bring their tenets of faith to the
public sphere and pursue tangible goals for social justice.
REGIONALISM AND THE CREATION OF MOSES
True to this philosophy, in the early 1990s, WDIFCO and Jeremiah organized “in-
reach” campaigns within congregations and around neighborhood concerns. They soon
achieved visible successes: removing drug paraphernalia in party stores, rehabbing
homes, and pressuring the city to tear down abandoned housing and fund parks and
recreation (O’Brien 2006). Congregations also created neighborhood “Safe Zones” in
which participants surveyed their neighbors about safety concerns in door-to-door “porch
patrols” around the area of a church or school (Amick 1996a; Vatcher 1997).14 Members
developed relationships with law enforcement and met with agencies responsible for pub-
lic health, public works, street lighting and safety, and businesses (Delaney 1996; Selwa
2002). By the mid-1990s, Safe Zones resulted in dozens of victories: drug houses busted,
dump sites cleaned, and dangerous buildings demolished. The city eliminated an area
of prostitution on school grounds and reopened a local park.15 The districts pressured
officials to raze abandoned housing, commit police to work with residents, and redevelop
targeted blight (Askari 1994; Hopkins 1994). Jeremiah members successfully lobbied the
federal government to build a sound barrier along Interstate 75.16
As the victories grew, organizers began considering how to connect their efforts
across the city (Amick 1996a). Their interest dovetailed with Gamaliel’s consulta-
tion with regionalist scholars: presentations by Myron Orfield, David Rusk, and John
Powell encouraged the senior staff to adopt regional equity organizing as a guid-
ing strategy. Regional maps and analyses made apparent the dynamics of population
movements, poverty, segregation, and taxes, and showed how these processes affect
neighborhoods (Orfield and Luce 2003). The research resonated with Detroit activists,
providing systemic explanations for what their communities were experiencing and sug-
gesting a strategy that fit their ecumenical values. Organizers were also influenced by
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other Gamaliel affiliates that were “coming to the same conclusion” about regionalism,
in Indiana, Chicago, St. Louis, and Cleveland.17
After WDIFCO leaders attended a retreat with presentations by Orfield and Rusk, they
reflected on their experience with affordable housing development. The district had re-
ceived a HUD (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development) Hope III Im-
plementation Grant and rehabbed houses with that funding over five years. The usual
approach had been to target a single dilapidated house, but “six months later, there were
three more abandoned houses on that block” (Liske 2005). They became concerned
that their efforts were ultimately concentrating poverty, limiting families’ chances for
long-term success. “The leaders said, we’ve got to create an organization that’s metrowide
and working on some of these issues” (Liske 2005). As political organizing became more
central to their mission, WDIFCO separated the housing component and renamed the
political organizing project RUTH.18
Persuaded about the limitations of localism, in 1994 the WDIFCO leadership ratified
a “Metro Organizing Strategy” (MOS) to support creating other city districts, with the
intention to build a federation in 1996.19 Seeking to maintain internal accountability
and anticipating needless competition, the districts rejected the goal of a local federation
in favor of one metrowide organization. Liske wrote, “Assuming we can create strong
congregational and regional structures . . . this is the best option for a strong future.”20
Organizers knew that this was not a given; creating strong congregational teams proved
an ongoing challenge. In a memo to the MOS Steering Committee in August 1995, Liske
wrote, “With the exception of the southwest region, none of the regions are anywhere
near where we had hoped eight months ago. The southeast region especially is way
behind the schedule. It in essence doesn’t exist except in a few (but determined) pas-
tors’ minds.” The Northeast Organization Allied for Hope (NOAH), covering eastern
and central Detroit, began meeting as a third district in 1995. The group achieved some
small victories such as greater police patrols in Northeast neighborhoods, but they never
achieved the grounding of the western districts (Amick 1996b). And other organizing
efforts on the lower east side, for a time called ESTHER, never coalesced into a district.21
Over a period of at least three years, the districts discussed the creation of a metropoli-
tan organization. Organizer Ponsella Hardaway explained that they wrestled with this
transition:
We were just neighborhood organizing and we wanted to hold the mayor account-
able for the garbage dumps in our neighborhoods and the blighted housing. [ . . . ]
You have to constantly talk to people about this sophisticated way of organizing to
get them to understand. Oh, this is why our region is in such trouble. (Hardaway
2006).
Jeremiah’s board minutes from February 1996 suggest uncertainty among the clergy.
They hoped that by combining the districts they would be able to acquire more funding,
accomplish more on a larger scale, and maintain Jeremiah’s identity. But some asked for
examples of how the churches would benefit, and one pastor argued, “we should move
slower, or we will not accomplish much with our organizing.”22
A meeting on April 20, 1996, included Myron Orfield to address district leaders on
the following questions: “Do we need MOSES? How would our lives be better? Will
MOSES help my congregation? What would MOSES look like?”23 In a speech to Jeremiah
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members, Rev. Cain of Waterfall Baptist spoke to uncertainty over the metropolitan
strategy.
As we were planning the agenda . . . the question came up about how we can con-
vince our congregations of the need for a MOSES. Then my thoughts were – how
quickly we forget, or how slow we are to remember and understand what Jeremiah
has done by itself and what the others have done by themselves. Now, what do you
think we could do together? Could we hurt ourselves by being in an organization
that covers the counties of Wayne, Oakland, or Monroe?24
In an urgent speech to a meeting of the combined districts in June 1996, lay leader
Victoria Kovari25 advocated for unification, connecting the prophet Jeremiah’s call to
“return people to the land” to the need for the districts to collectively push for govern-
ment action on land use.
We need to get the city and county together and stop fighting each other. We need
to get them together to support community groups that are doing housing. [ . . . ]
Nobody else is going to start rebuilding these neighborhoods. [ . . . ] So, we the
people who are going tomake upMOSES [ . . . ] wemust change the way land is used
and abused in this community, across Wayne county, across metropolitan Detroit.
We need each other. Jeremiah—I’m telling you—Jeremiah cannot do it by itself.
I’m telling you we have tried. We have tried. We can’t even get a list of the property
the city owns in our neighborhood, let alone change the way they use it. WDIFCO
is the same way, NOAH you can’t do it by yourself. We have no choice but to get
together all of us across the city and say, hey this is the way it’s going to be.26
Kovari and other leaders interpreted their inability to challenge the dynamics of disin-
vestment as proof they needed a larger organization. Despite uncertainty on what joining
forces would mean for congregations, members moved toward unification. In September
1998, the organizations held a “Visioning Conference” to review and agree upon a mis-
sion and basic goals, analyze the political environment, and develop a shared vision for
the future.27 One month later, the congregations formalized their unification by signing
the Declaration of Interdependence.
We, the undersigned, hereby commit ourselves to create a powerful organization
of the people who will pursue policies which achieve greater metropolitan equity.
[ . . . ] MOSES, acting in concert with their allies [ . . . ] do solemnly publish and
declare that all peoples and municipalities of this entire metropolitan area are, and
of right ought to be, INTERDEPENDENT ENTITIES.28
The unification was simultaneously an organizational and a political move, symbolic of
both what they wanted to become and the changes they hoped to bring to the region.
EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION
The decision to unify and expand required a shift in structure. With the founding
of MOSES, the districts created an Executive Committee comprised of six elected
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representatives from each district.29 Each district maintained responsibility for local re-
cruitment and action with its members. The goal of organizers was to continue to build
the base through in-reach campaigns and localized actions, while also recruiting new con-
gregations. With the help of an outside consultant, the organization further restructured
to address these goals.30 In February 1999, the Executive Committee voted to rename
and redefine itself as the Executive Board, as the day-to-day governance body.31 It estab-
lished a series of standing committees to parallel and include membership from district
standing committees.32 The MOSES Board of Directors redefined its role to function as
the ultimate voice of the membership through an annual convention.33
For MOSES, the importance of expanding regionally grew in tandem with leaders’ in-
terest in regional issues such as mass transit and land use. Whereas congregation- and
district-level actions were based on teams within congregations, task forces drew partic-
ipants to issues relevant across districts. The issue of transit became paramount to key
leaders, convinced that a regionally coordinated system is necessary for Detroit’s revival.
At a public meeting in November 1999, seeking increased state funding for public transit,
MOSES brought together 800 church members, as well as county executives, suburban
mayors, state legislators, and representatives of five major corporations. Kovari, the lead
organizer on transit, explained, “Our strategy is to try to get these players on the same
stage and try to create regional unity around increased funding, [ . . . ] with people from
all of our churches in the background daring them to say no” (Bagwell 1999). The fol-
lowing April, the group organized a hearing on transit funding in the state legislature;
their actions led to a $50 million increase for public transportation spending (Ankeny
2002).
As MOSES expanded their networks, staff organizers took on more congregations.34
In Jeremiah the organizers initially worked with 6–12 core teams. But with expan-
sion the goal grew eventually to manage 25–40 congregations each, to reach 100–150
member institutions total. In the late 1990s, staff stepped up recruitment to balance
city and suburban members. The Executive Director wrote in 1999, “I envision a Fall
2000 entering group of 40+ suburban congregations ready for a covenant with MOSES
congregations.”35
After unification, to better influence state policy, organizer responsibilities expanded
to work with not only individual congregations but also task forces and allied organiza-
tions in other cities.36 In 2000, one organizer began to work full-time with leaders in
Saginaw and Kalamazoo; this statewide initiative became Michigan Interfaith Voice (MI-
VOICE; Pastor et al. 2009, p. 89).37 Another added consulting for Gamaliel in New York
and Ohio.
Maintaining congregation-level actions became increasingly difficult. Stretched by
their regional responsibilities, professional organizers expected that advanced lay lead-
ers would take on some responsibilities within their churches. The strain surfaced in
comments like this: “Director’s Summary: I am very disappointed in the lackluster out-
reach and few actions. [ . . . ] Many wait for the organizers to call, plan the action, do the
turnout, do the thinking, do the agendas.”38
MOSES continued to build on its successes, but its expansion felt costly to some mem-
bers who preferred a local focus. In September 1999, the RUTH Board wrote a memo-
randum to the Executive Committee, listing concerns about the state of the organization,
including Gamaliel’s training methods, lack of staff time, and the shift to metropolitan
organizing. Whereas national organizers emphasized the importance of critical agitation
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to jostle participants from complacency, some trainees felt attacked rather than moti-
vated.39 RUTH’s letter reported that they had difficulty retaining prospective leaders who
attended Gamaliel’s national week-long training.
We understand how agitation can provide challenge and direction. . . .However, we
believe these tools should be less confrontational and more Christian . . . trainers
seem to hold preconceived assumptions that all their trainees are experienced in
community organizations.40
Led by Rev. Henry Sims, RUTH also argued that the districts were inadequately
staffed for the ends they desired, and some RUTH leaders believed Gamaliel held too
much influence over Detroit organizing priorities, “e.g., Urban Sprawl is a Gamaliel is-
sue not a grassroots issue.” RUTH leaders also feared an undermined role for the dis-
tricts: “The continuation of our current approach will leave little reason for District
involvement . . . and culminate in MOSES being a hollow shell without credibility or
respect.”41
This internal discussion carried racial connotations. Implicitly, longstanding racial in-
equality influenced RUTH’s concerns that the needs of city, African American churches
would go unmet and the focus would move to suburban and out-state efforts.42 Staff
organizers opposed RUTH’s proposals, worried they would void the Declaration of Inter-
dependence and jeopardize funding based on the metro-equity agenda. The Director
wrote,
The rage deep in our souls at conditions and suffering in Detroit and poorer sub-
urbs must be met by hope in new strategies. Old strategies of organizing will not
work anymore – they are too limited, insular, and don’t take into account changes
in our society that have driven people further and further apart geographically,
spiritually, racially, economically.43
The staff pointed to district and regional achievements as evidence that MOSES could
do both and insisted that Gamaliel did not control their territory.44 Organizers acknowl-
edged “the complicated path and the hard decisions that have to be made in ‘metropoli-
tan organizing.’”45 Their prevailing belief was that democratic organizations need to
change and grow to be relevant: “Every organization has to stretch beyond its own bound-
aries, be they geographical, issue, or racial.”46 Gamaliel’s Director Greg Galuzzo summed
up their thinking, “A congregation-based organization is either growing or dying.”47
MOSES moved forward with its regional agenda.
In 2002, organizers worked with suburban mayors and managers to help establish the
Michigan Suburbs Alliance, which supports intergovernmental cooperation and rein-
vestment in older suburbs.48 The MOSES public meeting in September 2002 reached a
zenith, convening 5,000 participants. Gubernatorial candidate Jennifer Granholm com-
mitted to three pieces of the MOSES transportation agenda: funding public transit with
10 percent of state gas tax revenue; appointing a new Director of MDOT49 with a record
of support for public transit, and supporting creation of the first regional transportation
authority for Detroit.50 With the success of this meeting, organizers proclaimed, “MOSES
is now on the radar screen nationally.”51 By 2003 MOSES was active in three counties and
about 70 congregations.
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MOSES leaders also added the courts to their action repertoire. In 2003, they brought
suit against SEMCOG, to challenge the disproportionate representation of newer sub-
urban governments on SEMCOG’s executive committee. A fairer representation of the
city’s population could redirect more federal transportation dollars to older infrastruc-
ture (Schneider 2004).52 MOSES lost the case but won political recognition: transit meet-
ings with Detroit’s previously unresponsive mayoral staff and over 20 meetings with busi-
ness leaders and elected officials to find supporters of regional transit (Williams 2006).53
Their efforts successfully pressured SEMCOG to study the feasibility of high-speed rail
along the I-94 corridor, from Detroit to Metro-Airport and Ann Arbor. MOSES then
assisted a group of wheelchair riders to file suit against the City to fix bus wheelchair lifts,
instigating investigation of the city by the U.S. DOT.54 In October 2005, the city agreed
to all demands and settled the case.55 In the process, MOSES also helped win passage of
a new state mandate requiring all public bus operators to verify working wheelchair lifts.
Despite this increased visibility, in Spring 2004, member evaluations revealed uncer-
tainty about the state of the organization.56 By all outward accounts, the 2004 public
meeting was a success, bringing in 4,500 participants, including Mayor Kilpatrick and
then-Governor Granholm. But participation fell short of the target of 7,000.
The organization’s challenges reflected changes in demographic context and the or-
ganizing strategy. Gamaliel’s organizing model relies on religious institutions and, in
particular, a mix of Catholic and Protestant congregations. Since the late 1960s, the
Catholic Archdiocese of Detroit closed and clustered dozens of older churches and trans-
ferred priests to newer parishes (Alcser 2005; Brand-Williams 2010). In 2003 and 2004,
six MOSES pastors were transferred to different churches. These clergy had mobilized
1,000 people in 2002 but could only turn out 200 in 2004 from their new congregations.
With the important exception of Detroit’s Latinos, the Catholic Church in Detroit no
longer has a significant urban base. And mobilization was not only a concern among
Catholics; some Protestant member churches moved or closed as well, or continued the
long-term adaptation to attract and maintain suburban congregants (Ammerman and
Farnsley 1997). The most successful megachurches have become cities unto themselves,
offering myriad social services and even job opportunities (Vann 2005). For these clergy,
membership in a MOSES is incidental; their size and resources allow direct access to
politicians, and service-provision takes priority over mobilization.
Issue expansion also affected mobilization capacity. As MOSES staff became more in-
volved in task forces and interfacing with government officials, there was less attention to
“building the base” of core teams.57 One organizer explained,
It’s been a huge challenge for us to maintain our base. That’s why we have to con-
stantly recruit, which we haven’t been doing the last couple of years, and we have to
constantly rebuild those relationships and build new ones. And the more into issues
we get, the less we do the relationship building. (Kovari 2004)
Typically before a public meeting, MOSES would hold congregation in-reach meetings.
Victoria Kovari reflected, “We’ll go do one-on-ones with people, we’ll get people to do
one-on-ones with their folks, and we’ll end up in a public meeting. But we didn’t do that
this year, we barely did it two years ago. I think it showed with the weaker base.”
Lay leaders shared similar concerns in interviews. Henrietta Rogers, a leader from
Greater Southern Baptist, described a change in member participation after MOSES
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became a regional organization. “I can’t get them to go to the meetings now like I did
when it was with WDIFCO, because it’s not of their self-interest. When you start taking
on regional things, it’s not” (Rogers 2006). Asked if her church members were more con-
cerned with issues like abandoned housing in the neighborhood, she replied, “Instead of
abandoned houses all over the state, [laughs] you see what I’m saying?”
After unification, the districts had maintained separate boards until the number of
meetings became unwieldy. At a leadership assembly in 2006, leaders approved a change
in by-laws that confirmed the dissolution of the districts. The minutes explained, “Since
the districts have not been meeting or functioning well for the last several years it is
cumbersome even to hold district elections.”58 But that meant the kinds of issues more
likely to arise in district meetings did not have a setting for incubation, especially if a
church’s core team was inactive. Some members that were a part of the districts in the
mid-1990s continued to carry on their own local actions, as did newer members that never
had a district affiliation. But others participated in name only, with little involvement in
decision making or building the organization.
Angela Kaiser’s (2010) recent research on social capital in MOSES confirms a
limited use of one-on-ones and limited development of teams within congregations
(p. 199). Her interviews reveal, “many congregations did not have organized core
teams. . . .Relationships that were formed and sustained seem to be more a result of indi-
vidual members reaching out and establishing contact,” than an intentional strategy for
developing relationships (pp. 246–247). And interviewees report a decline in member
participation over time, particularly regarding individual church actions (p. 217).
Kaiser suggests a need for more purposeful bridging strategy to increase understand-
ing and shared identity across race and place. In my interviews, active participants praised
the organization for creating bridging opportunities enabling some close, lasting friend-
ships. But the experience of key leaders is distinct from the rank and file in congregations
who are often only distantly connected to teams, task forces, and issues. In her surveys,
Kaiser finds ongoing city–suburb tensions within the organization and a tendency for
certain issue task forces to be racially and geographically homogeneous (p. 233).59 The
underlying organizing method appears to assume that focusing on issue actions requires
enough interaction and respect across identity groups to provide widespread support for
the regional agenda. Yet as the organization focuses on developing ties across a larger
territory, interracial and intercultural tensions persist. The value of more personal inter-
racial and interreligious exchange may be taken for granted as leaders are pressed to
focus on relationships that lead more quickly to desired political outcomes.
ANALYSIS
The history of MOSES reveals several transitions of scaling up for greater impact, sum-
marized in Figure 2. The top row lists key characteristics that shifted with the move to
a citywide and regional structure, including the organization’s purpose, relational base,
approach to leadership, and strategy for empowerment.
Initially, the work of organizers focused on cultivating relationships within church core
teams and across churches to form districts. But the young organizations quickly found
that structural forces limited their impact. Leaders were motivated to adopt a regional
equity agenda to influence elected officials throughout the region and the state. With
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FIG. 2. Summary of organizational transitions with the shift to the regional strategy.
this move, staff energies were spread over a greater geographic area. The decrease in staff
attention and change in issue focus were perceived as costs by some members, especially
in struggling city neighborhoods.
With the regional strategy, key leaders that emerged from the early organizing efforts
shifted their energies toward mobilizing a broader coalition, including suburban congre-
gations, public officials, unions, and advocacy groups (Thayer 2001, 2003; TRU 2008).
Whereas core teams continued with varying levels of engagement, task forces became
the primary relational base for political action.60 This shift made strategic sense given
regional trends, including the “shrinking” of the city and the increasing symptoms of
disinvestment in older suburbs. Task forces proved adept at the research and coordina-
tion necessary for issue campaigns, bringing in a variety of local experts to meet and dis-
cuss strategy. In this way, some task forces began to resemble specialized interest groups
but with the active participation of nonprofessionals from congregations who developed
expertise through their sustained involvement. The approach to leadership shifted as
active participants developed experience, took on more responsibility, and became iden-
tifiable to others as key leaders.
Finally, this transformation meant a shift in the underlying democratic strategy for
empowerment. There are two primary ways that community organizations can empower
their membership. The first is by helping people connect personal obstacles to public
injustice, or consciousness raising to develop a shared voice. Second, organizations em-
power their members by helping them be heard—by prioritizing issues, building strategic
relationships, making demands, and holding public officials accountable. These are both
necessary components of empowerment in civic life and they are not mutually exclusive,
but they do require distinct organizational strategies. The former requires organizations
to reflect members’ unique experiences and validate their struggles. The latter requires
groups to frame issues for a wider public and symbolically represent their members as
unified in public debate.
Early actions by core teams and districts were empowering by developing a public
voice for a diverse group of congregations. Once they built a shared identity through
local actions, leaders became frustrated by the barriers to being heard at the city level:
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dwindling public resources, city–suburb competition, and officials playing the race card.
To challenge these barriers more effectively, strategy shifted from building local districts
to expansion into a broader, more diverse coalition.
Being heard serves a symbolic purpose beyond power in numbers. For the leadership,
MOSES came to represent regional diversity in an otherwise polarized political environ-
ment. Active leaders were always aware of the contrast between their personal experiences
of working together and the everyday divisions of race and place in Detroit. The leaders
self-consciously viewed themselves as modeling constructive interracial collaboration.61
The new regional structure was not only a means to an end but a symbol of what they
hoped to achieve: a region that works for the majority of its residents by transcending
the boundaries of race, religion, and place. But given the organization’s breadth and
resource limitations, racial integration and shared purpose did not reach far into the
pews.
CODA
Detroit has faced significant challenges since primary fieldwork for this research ended
in 2006. But the city’s recent struggles largely hold true to the adage that the more
the things change, the more they remain the same. The recession of 2008–2009 com-
pounded a decade of job losses in Michigan, which never recovered from the recession
of 2001 (Lupo 2008). In autumn 2011, the region’s unemployment rate of 14.4 percent
remained the highest among the nation’s most populous metropolitan areas (Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2011). Excesses of the mortgage industry, predatory lending, and job loss
undermined Detroit’s already-weak housing market, and Detroit’s homeowners buckle
under the highest property tax rates in the state (Aguilar 2007; MacDonald 2011). If
there is anything positive to say about these crises, it is that Detroit’s embattled reputa-
tion has sparked interest among young people to be a part of a more sustainable renewal.
And while the city continues to hemorrhage residents, many Detroiters are committed
to reshaping their city. In 2010 the Bing administration launched the “Detroit Works”
project, a visioning process for consolidating services and land use in response to perpet-
ual budget deficits.62 City-hosted community meetings involved nearly 10,000 Detroiters
in vigorous discussions of vacancies and safety, as well as fears that the process will sideline
some neighborhoods.
Despite recent crises, the purpose and direction of MOSES has largely remained the
same. MOSES is not a service provider and can do little for members undergoing fore-
closure or suffering job loss. The organization maintains active task forces on transporta-
tion, immigration, and health care, and added a grocery store task force to address the
city’s “food desert” (Kaiser 2010, p. 187; Walsh 2010). Some leaders argue that MOSES
does not receive enough credit for its efforts, such as the encouraging progress toward
a regional transit system—a goal MOSES has pursued for over a decade (Helms 2011;
Turman 2011). The complexity of their targeted issues, involvement in state and national
coalitions, and incremental policy progress enable co-optation of MOSES’s agenda and
undermines the ability to claim victories (Hardaway 2011).
The organization has faced tremendous leadership turnover in recent years. It lost se-
nior organizers to other opportunities, hired new organizers, and changed presidents
twice since 2010 (Kaiser 2010, p. 195; Hardaway 2011). For the Director, this period of
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adjustment raised questions of how to best maintain multiple levels of organizing. In
recognition of a need for more in-depth relationship building, MOSES staff recently de-
veloped a survey tool for congregations (Hardaway 2011). Lay people will collect personal
stories from their peers on specific issues, in contrast to typically open-ended one-to-one
interviews. Leaders hope that this information, once compiled, will provide a snapshot
for congregations of member concerns while also rebuilding a stronger relational base. If
applied across the organization’s regional members, this could also be a way for members
to compare lived realities to better understand their differences and find shared ground
for future action.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper traces how several small, district-based organizations “scaled up” to unite as
a citywide and regional organization, with aspirations to influence state politics. The col-
lective decision to unite and expand was based on recognition of limitations at the local
level, both in terms of the influence of urban churches and in terms of the capacity of
local government, given a decreasing population and tax base. The decision to unite was
also based on the availability of an alternative frame for understanding the origins of
neighborhood conditions in regional terms. Local people built an influential organiza-
tion rooted in religious institutions with multiplying allies across government, academia,
and advocacy organizations. They sought to create an organization that mirrored the
scope of the problem and expand their base of power. As in other urban areas through-
out the United States, they engaged in “metropolitics” (Orfield 1997).
The historical trajectory reveals many successes and challenges of scaling up a commu-
nity organization. The congregation-based model of organizing seeks to reflect members’
current interests and yet grow to build relationships that will transcend existing political
boundaries. These are ambitious goals requiring multiple levels of relationships and tar-
gets, at times pulling members in different directions. This paper identified three key
challenges that, in conclusion, suggest ways to balance multiple, at times competing, or-
ganizational goals.
The first challenge of expansion for a democratic organization is maintaining the
group’s shared identity. In themid-1990s, themembers thoughtfully discussed and sought
expansion for greater influence; once members agreed to grow, that choice drew energy
away from interpersonal relationships and church-based teams that had connected or-
ganizers to the base and grassroot leadership development. The districts shifted from
a more parochial focus on local parks and housing abandonment to pressuring legisla-
tors for transit funding and involvement in national coalitions. These shifts created new
opportunities for active members in leadership and policy expertise but led others to
question their collective purpose and shared interests.
MOSES’s authenticity is rooted in its congregational base and clergy-driven mobiliza-
tion.63 The priorities of congregation-based organizations must be true to member con-
cerns, the source of their identity, and democratic power. Organization-wide framing
should continually reflect and complement local concerns. If internal relationship build-
ing still speaks to the needs of member clergy, then it makes sense for organizers to sup-
port bonding within congregations and organize around their priority issues. This need
not mean a return to parochialism if organizers can also engage members in political
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education on the larger forces shaping local conditions and incorporate interfaith and
interracial bridging.
The development of this bridging social capital is a second key challenge for scaling up.
In MOSES, both city and suburban members are committed to regional collaboration,
but in practice, working relationships across racial groups remain limited (Kaiser 2010,
p. 197). In most cases this does not reflect an outright unwillingness to collaborate but
different kinds of issues loom largest in members’ worldviews. City clergy are focused on
issues of immediate urgency: reductions in social welfare programs, the state’s emergency
manager law, crime, and beleaguered public schools (Turman 2011). Suburban clergy
are concerned about foreclosures and the decline of services but are less accustomed to
bringing political issues to the pulpit. Suburban congregants often do not believe they
share much in common with Detroiters, and city clergy wonder how their peers north of
8 Mile Road can be committed to a shared agenda if their members are not.
In response, MOSES could address racial and religious differences more directly across
congregations and task forces. This would allow rank and file members to address linger-
ing questions about the purpose and control of the organization. Some members have
raised concerns that a regional organization will respond to the needs of its most priv-
ileged members and reproduce unequal power relations. A more intentional bridging
strategy would include not only bringing together diverse members who agree on certain
policy objectives but also working through the tensions that arise from shared ownership
in an unequal society. As the northern suburbs of Detroit continue to diversify, in part
due to continued population loss in the city, there may be more opportunities to raise
bridging conversations within and across congregations.
In this spirit of inclusiveness, MOSES could also reach out more to non-Christian in-
stitutions. It has few Jewish or Islamic members, not to mention other faiths, despite the
increasing international diversity of Southeast Michigan. Such an effort should not be
for expansion’s sake alone, because superficial bridging without engagement from the
base could backfire for an already-stretched organization. Instead, exposure to greater
religious diversity could facilitate deeper discussions on the organization’s identity and
make MOSES a more credible voice of interfaith leadership in the region.
A third challenge for growing local organizations is to clarify relationships with state
and national networks. Organizers are pressed to balance multiple responsibilities: re-
cruiting and training local members while analyzing changing political conditions and
opportunities for action. The more levels of government a group targets, the more chal-
lenged organizers will be to maintain this balance and respond to shifts in the political
and issue environment. Here is an opportunity for national networks such as Gamaliel
to assist by following higher-level political dynamics and coordinating across local cam-
paigns. In its historical progression, some MOSES members expressed uncertainty over
the affiliate’s relationship with the national network and concern over the influence of
national staff. The introduction of national issues into local agendas can feel like an
imposition to some members. For instance, when MOSES joined Gamaliel’s campaigns
for the Dream Act and immigration reform, some members questioned whether these
should be local priorities. The relative isolation of the immigration task force exacer-
bated this tension because other members had little understanding of the pressures on
immigrant communities. Although it is the responsibility of local affiliates to facilitate in-
ternal bridging, national staff can help by supporting coordination across affiliates and
framing national initiatives around local agendas.
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This case study enabled a close look at the expansion of a particular organizing project
in an especially challenging context. The generalizability of the findings is uncertain, in
comparison both to groups affiliated with different national networks and to organiza-
tions in cities facing different challenges than Detroit. Practitioners would benefit from
further research comparing organizations working for metropolitan equity, to identify how
scaling up can be most beneficial for member empowerment and policy impact in various
political contexts.
These research findings are also limited by the method of data collection. Aside
from a focus group of suburban clergy early in the research process, this study more
fully represents the views of city clergy than their suburban peers who joined later, al-
though their perspectives were represented in task force and clergy caucus meetings
throughout the fieldwork. Given the long-term shifts in population and diversification of
out-migrants, further research is needed on the challenges and opportunities for metro-
equity campaigns in suburban areas. A comparative study could help scholars iden-
tify what factors affect the ability of organizations to successfully scale up. Such fac-
tors may include the age, experience, and scope of a local organization, the strength
of member commitment and social divisions in the base, the religious or congrega-
tional underpinning of the organization, or the extent of regional collaboration by local
governments.64
This study relied heavily on archival data and the memories of interviewees to doc-
ument discussions and debates from the mid-1990s. For future research, real-time ob-
servations could better assess internal power dynamics across racial or socioeconomic
groups and characterize the quality of such discussions driving organizational change.
Such research would be of interest to the students of democratic practices beyond the
niche field of community organizing. For instance, the study of organizing could fur-
ther our understanding of tradeoffs between democratic practices that privilege elite
or populist engagement (Skocpol 2003), and of tradeoffs for organizations investing in
deliberation or mobilization (Mutz 2006). Although scholars have closely documented
the philosophy and culture of institution-based organizing, there remains much to
learn about the process of decision making and reckoning within these organizations.
This case reveals concerted efforts at building a diverse membership and developing
policy expertise in contrast to traditional understandings of community organizing as
single-mindedly populist or conflict-driven. The strategy to scale up in metropolitan
Detroit reflected an urgent desire to do it all, to exercise democratic ideals of inclu-
sivity and listening while also building power for greater impact, mindful of the costs of
inaction.
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Notes
1 I draw from the Skoll Foundation’s definition of scaling up a program: “to significantly increase its impact
in size, amount, or extent.” This can occur through “growing an organization’s own capacity, developing inde-
pendent affiliates or franchises, encouraging widespread adoption of the model by others or creating strategic
partnerships that enable greater reach” (Skoll 2010).
2 DeFilippis, Fisher, and Shragge (2010) write that Alinsky “was uncertain how to resolve the tension inherent
in building a national organizational structure . . .while focusing on the specific needs and people involved in
each local community” (p. 51).
3 ACORN has been an important model for what can be accomplished nationally—although it is not an
example of institution-based organizing. ACORN’s decisions on “where to focus campaigns” were pragmatic
choices, based on the context of political opportunities and constraints (Swarts 2007, p. 147).
4 The Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) and People Improving Communities Through Organizing (PICO)
are two extensive congregation-based organizing networks in the United States (Warren and Wood 2001).
5 Cited documents are from the MOSES archive at the University of Michigan’s Bentley Historical Library
(hereafter, Bentley archive).
6 In 2003, MOSES listed 43 congregations in the city of Detroit as dues paying members; I ultimately inter-
viewed clergy and lay leaders representing 26 of those churches; 14 of were predominantly white congregations
in northern suburbs and 3 were in suburbs south of the city. MOSES also had four African American or mixed
race congregations in older suburbs bordering the city on the Southwest. The 49 formal interviews included
26 African Americans, 17 white-Anglos, and 6 Latinos. For initial interview questions, see (Rusch 2008, p. 227).
Although the questions did not ask about changes in organizational structure, the topic arose in multiple inter-
views in response to the question of how the interviewee became involved in MOSES. In this way the analysis is
also informed by grounded theory methodology (Strauss and Corbin 1994, p. 274).
7 Exceptions included Rev. Joe Gagnon of Melvindale, whom I interviewed as an early leader of Jeremiah, and
Rev. Stan Ulman, who was moved to a suburban parish.
8 Chrysler’s edgy, pro-Detroit Super Bowl ad drew local acclaim and some critique in 2011 (Dzwonkowski
2011; Weinstein 2011).
9 The designated Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), Southeast Michigan Council of Governments
(SEMCOG), operates as an advisory body. See http://www.semcog.org/.
10 For a complete list of WDIFCO members, see Bentley archive, Box 1, CHD National folder. It originally
included five Catholic, three Baptist, two Evangelical Lutheran, one Episcopal, and one Presbyterian Church.
11 The name Jeremiah was suggested by Rev. Fenton of Zion Lutheran, based on Jeremiah 32:15, “Houses,
fields and vineyards shall again be bought in this land.”
12 Gamaliel is one of a handful of national congregation-based organizing networks that trace their
roots to the practices and philosophy of Saul Alinsky and to the Civil Rights and Labor Movements. See
http://www.gamaliel.org/.
13 Gamaliel Foundation, “Church Based Organizing: A Strategy for Ministry,” Bentley archive, Box 1,
Folder 1, pages I-XIV.
14 Safe Zones were supported by a partnership with the Detroit Bureau of Substance Abuse. MOSES News
Update, Fall 2003. Also see Bentley archive, Box 3, Exec. Board 1998 folder, Exec. Summary (11/14/96), Na-
tional CHD Application, page A-3.
15 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board 1998 folder, MOSES Board Minutes, May 15, 1997, p. 2.
16 That victory was the result of collaboration by leaders from Sts. Andrew and Benedict, All Saints Catholic,
Waterfall Baptist, Southwestern Church of God, and Mt. Zion Missionary Baptist Church (Selwa 2002). In
addition, Jeremiah created the Jeremiah Community Development Corporation (JCDC) and in 1999, built 60
low-income single family homes through its $12 million Newberry Estates project in Southwest Detroit (Ankeny
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2002). This was the largest single-family development effort in the area in decades (Chambers 2002). Chaired
by Kovari, the JCDC acquired vacant lots and secured $6 million in tax credits from the state housing authority
(Gargaro 1997).
17 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board 1998 folder, letter dated Mar. 17, 1995, p. 2.
18 RUTH stands for Residents United Together in Hope. Explaining the reason for the separation, Liske said
there were “some people that were in housing that felt they had to cultivate a favorable relationship with the
city. [ . . . ] It was two different ways of operating. And eventually it was spun off” (2005).
19 Bentley archive, Box 1, CHD National folder, 1995 Application, Section A, Introduction, page 1.
20 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board 1998 folder, letter dated Mar. 17, 1995, p. 4.
21 ESTHER stood for East-siders Standing Together (Esparza 1996). Three pastors were initially involved, but
apparently all three envisioned themselves as the president and “they weren’t exactly talking with each other”
(Liske 2006). This sector of the city posed unique challenges for community organizing. Known for areas
of concentrated poverty and abandonment, it was sometimes called a “demilitarized zone.” In addition, the
east side had strong community development organizations in place, with their own processes of training and
organizing. These included U-SNAP-BAC (United Streets Networking and Planning: Building a Community)
housing and the Warren/Connor Economic Development Corporation (Liske 2006).
22 Bentley archive, Box 2, Jeremiah Board Meeting 1994–1996 folder, Minutes, Jeremiah Project Board
Meeting, February 8, 1996, page 1.
23 Bentley archive, Box 2, Jeremiah Board Meeting 1994–1996 folder, flier included with Board Meeting
Agenda, April 11, 1996.
24 Bentley archive, Box 2, Jeremiah Board Meeting 1994–1996 folder, Rev. E. Cain. Speech is undated,
page 4.
25 Kovari later became a senior organizer with MOSES. She formerly organized with the Detroit Tenants’
Union and Detroit Organization of Tenants, and worked with the United Community Housing Coalition in the
1980s. In 1993 she managed City Councilor Maryann Mahaffey’s campaign for Council President. Mahaffey was
a champion for Detroit’s affordable housing and homeless organizations and challenged Mayor Young’s budget
proposals (Shaw 1996).
26 Bentley archive, Box 1, Video: “Together for a Change.”
27 Bentley archive, Box 2, Blue Binder (1999), MOSES Visioning Conference flier.
28 Bentley archive, Box 1, Declaration of Interdependence folder.
29 Bentley archive, Box 1, folder 1, “Expand, Recruit, Consolidate”: A draft plan for MOSES 2000–2003 by Bill
O’Brien, March 6, 2000, page 6.
30 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000 folder, “Dr. Hal Stack’s Recommendations
for Restructuring,” June 17, 1998, pages 1–5. The Executive Committee voted to recommend that the MOSES
Board accept the recommendations, February 11, 1999. Memo from the Structure and Governance Task Force,
to the MOSES Executive Committee, dated Jan. 4, 1999, pages D1-D7.
31 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1998 folder, MOSES Bylaws, Amendments approved
August 13, 1998, page 1.
32 Each standing committee was chaired by a member of the MOSES Executive Board and included rep-
resentatives from the parallel district committees. Examples include Finance and Development, Membership
Recruitment and Training, and Fundraising.
33 At this convention the board would elect MOSES officers, review the progress of the organization, and
approve the budget.
34 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000, “Paradigm Shift: Leadership-Driven Orga-
nizing = Leaders Acting Like Organizers.”
35 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000, “6 month review of MOSES 1999” by Bill
O’Brien (submitted to the Executive Board Aug. 19, 1999), page 2.
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36 Phone conversation with Liske, November 16, 2006.
37 These included ISAAC (Interfaith Strategy for Advocacy and Action in the Community) in Kalamazoo and
Ezekiel in Saginaw, which incorporated with MOSES as MI-Voice, September 30, 2003. They were later joined
by JONAH (Joint Religious Network for Advocacy and Hope) in Battle Creek, Michigan.
38 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000, “6 month review of MOSES 1999” by Bill
O’Brien (submitted to the Executive Board Aug. 19, 1999), page 4, under “Core Team Weaknesses.”
39 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000 folder, Executive Committee Minutes,
Oct. 30, 1997, page 3.
40 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000 folder, Letter to Greg Galuzzo and Senior
Staff from the RUTH Board, July 13, 1999.
41 The RUTH Executive Board voted in support of the memo. Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meet-
ings 1999–2000. Memo dated Sept. 2, 1999, page 1.
42 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000, MOSES Memo from Bill O’Brien to Rev.
Barlow, President, Oct. 5, 1999. For a fuller discussion of racial politics in MOSES, see (Rusch 2010).
43 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000 folder, Memo from Bill O’Brien to the Exec-
utive Board, “RUTH’s 3rd Recommendation,” page 2A.
44 In the end, Rev. Sims left MOSES, with the reason that he was too busy after being elected as the local rep-
resentative for his denomination. Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000, “Staff Report
to MOSES Officers on the RUTH Recommendations,” Oct. 9, 1999, pages 1–4.
45 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board Meetings 1999–2000, MOSES Memo from Bill O’Brien to Rev.
Barlow, President, Oct. 5, 1999.
46 Conversation with Liske, November 16, 2006.
47 Bentley archive, Box 3, Executive Board 1998 folder, MOSES Board Minutes, May 15, 1997, p. 3.
48 The MSA is now an independent organization encouraging regional collaboration and joint service deliv-
ery. See www.michigansuburbsalliance.org.
49 The Michigan Department of Transportation.
50 Ultimately a court decision prevented the authority’s creation, because the deal lacked a funding mecha-
nism (Gray 2006).
51 Internal report generated 10-10-02 by MOSES staff/board, included in Agenda for PMOC: Public Meeting
Organizing Committee Meeting, April 20, 2004, p. 10–11.
52 Only 5 percent of the SEMCOG executive committee represents Detroit; Detroiters comprise 19 percent
of the population of the Council’s region (Schneider 2004).
53 MOSES Program, “Back to Basics,” 8th Annual Martin Luther King, Jr. Banquet, January 17, 2005, Major
Accomplishments in 2004.
54 This action was led by two MOSES participants, attorneys Richard Bernstein and Gary Benjamin (Schmitt
and Schaefer 2005).
55 The Department of Justice agreed to monitor the city’s compliance with provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. MOSES Program, “In Tribute to Rosa Parks and the 50th Anniversary of the Montgomery Bus
Boycott,” 9th Annual Martin Luther King Banquet, January 16, 2006, Major Accomplishments in 2005.
56 Organizer Kovari reported on the evaluations. A Catholic leader noted attendance at MOSES meetings was
dropping off and questioned how to attain more participation from the congregations. Field notes, April 26,
2004. Public Meeting Organizing Committee meeting agenda.
57 Conversations with Kovari Dec. 9, 2003, and with Father Joe Gagnon, Jan. 13, 2005.
58 The group decided to elect the Executive Board at-large from the Board of Directors rather than electing
representatives from the districts. Leadership Assembly agenda, Feb. 12, 2006. Greater Apostolic Faith Temple,
Detroit.
59 For example, the civil rights and immigration task force and the health care task force.
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60 Kaiser also describes task forces as “the primary vehicle for involvement” of nonclergy in MOSES (p. 232).
61 For example, the organization promoted itself in terms of this diversity, as “Inter -faith, Inter -racial, Inter -
suburb, Inter -city.” Bentley archive, Box 2, Black Binder, “MOSES In Congress” flier, “Declaration of Interde-
pendence,” Oct. 18, 1998.
62 See the City’s website: http://detroitworksproject.com/.
63 Bentley archive, Box 1, folder 1, “Expand, Recruit, Consolidate: A draft plan for MOSES 2000–2003,”
March 6, 2000, page 6.
64 For instance, the PICO network organized at local levels in California for 30 years, including 10 years at
the state level, before venturing into national campaigns (Wood 2007, p. 169). In comparison, the districts that
created MOSES organized for only about five years before choosing a metro-equity agenda.
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CBCO Congregation-Based Community Organizing
CCHD Catholic Campaign for Human Development
DOT Department of Transportation
ESTHER East-Siders Standing Together
HUD U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
IAF Industrial Areas Foundation
ISAAC Interfaith Strategy for Advocacy and Action in the Community
JONAH Joint Religious Network for Advocacy and Hope
MI-VOICE Michigan Interfaith Voice
MOS Metropolitan Organizing Strategy
MOSES Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength
MPO Metropolitan Planning Organization
NOAH Northeast Organization Allied for Hope
PICO People Improving Communities Through Organizing
RUTH Residents United Together in Hope
SEMCOG Southeast Michigan Council of Governments
U-SNAP-BAC United Streets Networking and Planning: Building a Community
WDIFCO West Detroit Interfaith Community Organization
Crecimiento Regional: La evolucio´n de una estrategia de activismo social en Detroit
(Lara Rusch)
Resumen
En contextos marcados por una desigualdad metropolitana insoluble y recursos locales
limitados, los activistas comunitarios a menudo se sienten obligados a dirigir sus acciones
a niveles de gobierno ma´s alla´ de la autoridad local. Este artı´culo presenta un caso de
este tipo en Detroit, con proyectos locales de activismo en los que se uso´ esta estrategia
de crecimiento (“scaling up”) a mediados de los an˜os ’90 con el fin de desarrollar una
agenda regional de equidad. Usando observacio´n participante, archivos y entrevistas, el
artı´culo examina este proceso de unificacio´n e identifica cambios cruciales con respecto
al propo´sito, la plataforma de relaciones, el enfoque sobre el liderazgo y la estrategia
de empoderamiento. Aunque el proceso de crecimiento ayudo´ a los miembros a llevar
a cabo acciones ma´s sofisticadas e influenciar niveles superiores de gobierno, tambie´n
implico´ un gran desafı´o para la organizacio´n a la hora de mantener su membresı´a. Esta
investigacio´n sugiere que el proceso de “scaling up” implica soluciones de compromiso
para las organizaciones de base al tener que responder a su membresı´a original y, a la
vez, construir una estructura representativa al nivel regional, capaz de superar divisiones
en el ambiente polı´tico.
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